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The Bubble and Monetary Policy
in Japan: 1984-1989*
Atsushi Ichinose
Preface
The issue in this paper would be confined to the cause of the bubble
formation and development. To begin with, it would be useful to overview
briefly relevant preceding researches shown below. 1)
Y. Miyazaki, Fukugoh-Fukyoh: The Compound Depression, 1992
Y. Noguchi, Bubble no Kei-zai-gaku: Economics ofthe Bubble, 1992
Y. Suzuki, Ni-hon no Kin-yuh Sei-saku: Monetary Policy in Japan,
1993
Economic Planning Agency, Kei-zai Haku-sho, 1993: Economic
Survey ofJapan, 1993-94
Y. Habu, Gen-dai Kei-zai to Zai-sei: Contemporary Economy and
Public Finance, 1994
<other important books related>
Y. Funahashi, Tsuh-ka Retsu-retsu: The Rage of Currency
Competition, 1988
P. Volcker & T. Gyohten, Tomi no Koh-boh: Changing Fortunes,
1992
S. Nakao, Japan Money no Uchi-maku: The Inside Story of Japan
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Money, 1991
To our great regret, neither the Bank of Japan (BOJ) nor the Ministry
of Finance (MOF) has published any formal report on the bubble
economy, while the Economic Planning Agency analyzed it in its annual
White Paper, Economic Survey of Japan, 1993-94. The Survey regards
1986 as the beginning date of the bubble formation. It points out the
expectation for asset price rise as the most important factor of the bubble.
Meanwhile it also stresses the Bank Rate (BR) cuts in 1986-87 as an
important factor of the asset inflation. The latter seems to be supporting
the former as its ground.
Among individual economists, Professor Y. Miyazaki presented the
most full-scale analysis on the Japanese bubble. He lays emphasis on the
world-wide financial deregulation as the most important factor of the
bubble formation and development. His book contains almost all factors to
be discussed and is very instructive. But unfortunately he is not very
persuasive as to what part of, and how, the de-regulations brought about
the asset inflation.
*This paper is based on the report at the seminar held by the International Department
of the Bank of Canada on the 14 th July 1999. Let me thank the following people who
arranged for the seminar and gave me a lot of invaluable comments: Doctor Charles
Freedman (Deputy Governor), Professor David Laidler (Special Adviser, from
University of Western Ontario), all the staffs ofthe International Department headed
by Doctor John. D. Murray, Professor Thomas K. Rymes and Professor Nicholas Rowe
of Carleton University.
The content is basically the summary of Chapters 5 and 6 of A. Ichinose & H.
Sunami, Geki-doh-ki-no Nihon-ginkoh Kin-yuh Seisaku: 1971-89, The Bank of Japan
Monetary Policy in the Upheaval Period: 1971-89 (Dai-gaku Kyou-iku Shup-pan,
1999). But some alterlations have been added.
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Economists, who are deeply concerned with BOJ, generally stress the so
-called "internationally co-operative economic policy" in 1986 and 1987 as
the first factor of the bubble development. Here the international co-
operation means the Plaza Agreement (PA, Sep. 1985), the co-operative
BR cuts in 1986, and the Louvre Agreement (LA, Feb. 1987), and so on. A
representative of this view is Y. Suzuki, an influential ex-BOJ economist.
According to him, both BOJ and MOF hesitated to turn to tight money
policy after the Black Monday (BM, Oct. 1987), because they feared that
the turn to tight money must bring about depreciation of US dollar which
the U. S. eagerly wanted to avoid at that time. As a result, he says, the
bubble swelled because people came to hold an illusion as if the super
cheap money would last forever. One interesting aspect in his argument is
that he regards the bubble period in Japan as only after the Black
Monday.2) This narrow confinement of the period does not seem to be very
realistic.
Y. Noguchi regards from 1986 onwards as the bubble period. He points
out the improvement of fundamentals first: the maintenance of
unprecedented cheap-money policy and the increase of corporate profits
after PA. As the causes of the bubble formation he stresses the change of
the flow of funds (equity-finance and the so-called Zai-tech.) and improper
macro-economic policy (suppression of the floatation of national debt and
too long-lasted cheap-money policy due to the international policy co-
operation).
Y. Habu (1994) presents another wider view based on a historical and
comparative approach.
He emphasizes the shift of economic sovereignty from US to Japan as
the basis of the bubble in Japan of this time. In the new sovereignty
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country excess fund is bound to be formed through various channels,
which promotes the development of the bubble. He also stresses the
characteristics of Japanese tax system, which is very advantageous to
firms' asset transactions, as an important factor of the Japanese bubble
formation. As to the suppression of the floatation of national debt and the
long-lasted cheap-money policy, he agrees with Noguchi.
In short, preceding researches point out two factors as direct causes of
the bubble: the financial de-regulation and the international co-
operation of economic policy. This paper is not against these views at all.
However a big problem has been overlooked so far. The preceding
researches have neither solved nor raised the following question: why
did the huge bubble swell under the regime of rapid appreciation
of yen (the co-development of the bubble and the rapid
appreciation of yen) ? In this paper main attention will be focused on
this question.
Now let us give a glance at a series of Table 1 below (pages 5-7). They
will give us a rough image ofJapanese bubble in the international aspect.
One thing seems to be interesting. While there seems to be some
positive correlation, though not very clear, between 'M 2 - real GDP' and
consumer price, there is no correlation between asset price and M 2 at all.
Further, rather strangely, there seems to be a negative correlation,
though not so clear, between the appreciation of each national currency
against US dollar and stock prices of each country. Putting them aside, we
can notice how large the Japanese bubble was when we look again at
Table 1-(1).
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Table 1 (1) International Comparison: Stock Price Index
---------
Japan US Canada UK France (W)Germany
1984 10,560 1,178 516 180 1,026
........
85 12,565 1,328 100 631 243 1,408
86 16,401 1,793 111 785 363 2,012
87 23,248 2,276 132 1,026 268 1,769
........
88 27,038 2,061 122 932 1,573 1,454
89 34,058 2,509 140 1,110 2,001 1,826
......
1990 29,437 2,679 - 1,092 1,517 2,111
89/84 3.2 2.1 1.4 2.2 - 1.8
Japan: Nikkei 225 US: Dow Jones Industrial Average (30 stocks)
Canada: Toronto 300 UK: FT Acturies (1962. 4=100) France: CAC 40
(1987. 12.31 = 100) (W) Germany: Commerz Bank (1962.4. 10=100)
• France: year end Others: annual average
• Canada: bottom column, 89/85
(Source) Weekly Toyo Keizai, Extra Issue, Annual Economic Statistics (Data
Bank), 1995, pp. 460-496
Table 1 (2)-1 International Comparison: Money Supply (M 1)
(annual growth rate, seasonally adjusted) (%)
------
Japan US Canada UK France (W)Germany
1985 5.0 12.2 4.3 8.4 4.3
86 6.9 16.9 5.0 8.3 10.0
87 10.5 3.5 12.9 n.a. 4.8 9.0
88 8.4 5.0 6.1 2.6 9.7
89 4.1 0.9 4.6 5.7 6.3
1990 2.6 4.0 -1.9 4.1 14.3
ave. 85-89 7.0 7.7 6.6 6.0 7.9
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Table 1 (2)-2 International Comparison: Money Supply (M 2)
(annual growth rate, seasonally adjusted) (%)
-----
Japan US Canada UK France (W)Germany
1985 8.4 8.0 9.5 9.4 7.4 4.5
86 8.7 9.5 8.7 14.4 6.3 7.4
87 10.4 3.6 10.1 10.5 3.5 6.7
88 11.2 5.8 7.6 17.0 3.7 6.3
89 9.9 5.5 13.1 9.9 3.9 9.1
1990 11.7 3.8 10.6 7.9 1.1 19.1
ave. 85-89 9.7 6.5 9.8 12.2 4.5 6.8
Japan: M2+CD
(Source) IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1997, pp. 395, 409, 847,
853
BOJ, Economic Statistics Annual, 1992, p. 1 BOC, Bank ofCanada Review, April
1991, S 20
BOE, Bank ofEngland Statistical Abstract, 1992, p. 18
Table 1 (3) International Comparison: Real Growth ofGDP
(annual growth rate, seasonally adjusted) (%)
-----
Japan US Canada UK France (W)Germany
1984 4.3 6.2 6.3 2.3 1.3 2.8
85 5.0 3.2 4.8 3.8 1.9 2.3
86 2.6 2.9 3.3 4.3 2.5 2.3
87 4.1 3.1 4.3 4.8 2.3 1.4
88 6.2 3.9 4.9 5.0 4.5 3.6
89 4.7 2.5 2.4 2.2 4.3 3.7
1990 4.8 0.8 -0.2 0.4 2.5 5.7
ave. 85-89 4.5 3.1 3.9 4.0 3.1 2.7
M 2-realGDP 5.2 3.4 5.9 8.2 1.4 4.1
(Source) IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1998, p. 155
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Table 1 (4) International Comparison: Consumer Price Index
------
Japan US Canada UK France (W)Germany
1984 91.7 79.5 77.3 70.7 81.2 88.2
85 93.5 82.4 80.4 75.0 85.9 90.2
86 94.1 83.9 83.7 77.6 88.1 90.1
87 94.2 87.0 87.4 80.8 91.0 90.3
88 94.9 90.5 90.9 84.7 93.5 91.4
89 97.0 94.9 95.5 91.3 96.7 94.0
1990 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.5
89/84 1.06 1.19 1.24 1.29 1.19 1.07
1990=100 (Germany: 1991=100)
(Source) IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1997, pp. 295, 421, 435,
523,887,893
Table 1 (5) International Comparison: Exchange Rate
(against 1 US dollar*)
~ Japan Canada UK France (W)Germany
1984 238 1.30 1.34 8.74 2.85
85 239 1.37 1.30 8.99 2.94
86 169 1.39 1.47 6.93 2.17
87 145 1.33 1.64 6.01 1.80
88 128 1.23 1.78 5.96 1.76
89 138 1.18 1.64 6.38 1.88
1990 145 1.17 1.78 5.45 1.62
89/84 0.58 0.91 0.82 0.73 0.66
*UK: US dollar against 1 pound, bottom column = reciprocal
• rate = annual average
(Source) IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1997, pp. 293,
419,433,521,887
Section 1 The Early Stage of the Bubble (1984-1985)
In this paper we would like to avoid discussing what the definition of
the ''bubble'' is or should be:) Instead we only take an extraordinary rise
of asset prices for a bubble. Here the word "extraordinary" is used,
-7-
374
supposing our historical standard as its basis. In the post-war Japan,
when the rise of asset prices by about 20% (or more) continued for more
than two years, it was unusual. That is to say, we had such a rapid rise
only two times, from 1959 to 1961 and from 1972 to 1973 as are partly
seen in Table 2, and either ofthem ended with a crash.
Let us just refer to one merit when we adopt this extremely naive
approach. It would be quite rational to suppose that a certain size of GDP
of a country can support a certain amount of total asset price or the
earnings on such assets. Meanwhile, as is well known, the size of GDP
does not fluctuate so drastically: the movement ofGDP is relatively mild.
Therefore, even if we paid attention only to the movement of asset prices,
we would be able to judge whether the swollen assets, or their earnings,
could be supported for a Icing time by the GDP level of that year and after.
Table 2 Price ofStocks : Nikkei Averaged 225 Index
(yen)
year Nikkei 225 Index year Nikkei 225 Index
1971 2,385 81 7,510( 9.3)
72 3,755( 57.4) 82 7,399( -1.5)
73 4,759( 26.7) 83 8,808( 19.0)
74 4,276(-10.1) 84 10,560( 19.9)
75 4,243( -0.8) 85 12,565( 19.0)
76 4,65l( 9.6) 86 16,401( 30.5)
77 5,029( 8.1) 87 23,248( 41.7)
78 5,537( 10.1) 88 27,038( 16.3)
79 6,272( 13.3) 89 34,058( 26.0)
1980 6,870( 9.5) 1990 29,437(-13.6)
Figures show the annual average of day to day Nikkei
Averaged 225 Index.
Inside of each ( ) shows annual rate of growth.
(Source) Weekly Toyo Keizai Extra Issue, Annual Economic
Statistics (Data Bank), 1976, p.134, 1995, pp. 398-399
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Anyway when we adopt such a very naive approach, the year 1985, at
latest, seems to be already in the range of the bubble air mass. If we look
at Table 2 again, and at Table 3 , especially at the right column, B/A, we
can see the ratio of outstanding stocks to GNP in 1984 had already
exceeded the hitherto historical record of 1972, to say nothing of the ratio
in 1985. According to our examination, which is not shown here, the rise
ofthis ratio is not due to the volume of issued stocks but mainly due to the
soaring up of the price.
Table 3 Total Current Value ofStocks Listed on All ofthe Japanese
Stock Exchanges and its Ratio over GNP
(10 billion yen)
I~ (A) (B)GNP Total Current BfAValue (%)
1972 9,240 4,955 53.6*
73 11,252 4,003 35.6
74 13,400 3,747 28.0
75 14,817 4,478 30.2
76 16,642 5,492 33.0
77 18,553 5,364 28.9
78 20,447 6,906 33.8
79 22,182 7,202 32.5
1980 24,010 7,995 33.3
81 25,682 9,486 36.9
82 26,970 10,124 37.5
83 28,057 13,123 46.8
84 29,845 16,750 56.1
85 31,744 19,622 61.8
86 33,125 29,303 88.5
* The figure of 1972 had been the record. B: at the end of each year
(Source) Tokyo Stock Exchange, Annual Statistics ofSecurities, 1997,
p.10
Weekly Toyo Keizai, Extra Issue, Annual Economic Statistics (Data
Bank) , 1990, p. 72
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reviving business
increase ofprofits +
decline of interest
rates
Table 4
abolition ofyen-ten regulation
+
inflow offoreign short-term capital (impact loan,
Tables 7 & 8 typically)
conversion into yen
deposit with tokkin / fan-tara & land investments
+
active purchase of assets by banking sector
Table 6 (including trust banks)
'--~----> I the rise of asset prices I
Then why did such a sharp rise take place in 1984-85 ? Look at the
chart above.
No one will doubt that the recovery of business from the bottom of 1982
gave ground for the asset price rise from 1983 to 1985. This is clearly seen
in Table 4, especially in columns concerning profits. At the same time
rates of interest steadily declined up to 1989, which also bolstered the rise
of asset prices.
However 1985 was the year of mild recession. Further short-term rates
of interest became steeply higher from October due to the BOJ guidance!)
But even at that time stock prices rose as we see in Table 5.
Even taking a probable time lag into account, it seems to be difficult to
explain the sharp rise of asset prices in 1985 only with the trend of
business activity. Then what made the stock prices rise so sharply in 1984
-85 ?
Look at Table 6. The column of "corporations" in the middle shows that
in 1980's purchasing by corporation sector was always in excess of selling.
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This was the strongest supporter ofthe stock price rise through 1980's. In
the corporation sector banks were predominant. And from 1984 we can
Table 4 Profits of Firms* and Rates ofInterest (100 billion yen)
year operating current call rate yield of govern-
profits profits (%) ment bond (%)
1981 252(-5.3) 165(-8.3) 7.4 8.4
82 247(-2.0) 158(-4.2) 6.9 8.3
83 253( 2.4) 177(12.0) 6.4 7.8
84 286(13.0) 209(18.1) 6.1 7.3
85 289( 1.0) 217( 3.8) 6.5 6.5
86 267(-7.6) 214(-1.4) 4.8 5.2
87 319(19.5) 273(27.6) 3.5 5.0
88 401(25.7) 343(25.3) 3.6 4.8
89 451(12.5) 393(14.9) 4.9 5.2
1990 487( 8.0) 366(-6.9) 7.2 7.0
*Firms: all corporations for profit in all industries with capital stock of 10 m. yen
or more.
Figures inside ( ) are annual rate ofgrowth.
call rate: annual average of collateralized overnight, Tokyo
yield: annual average of end-month yields on government bonds maturing in 10
years.
(Source) Weekly Toyo Keizai, Extra Issue, Annual Economic Statistics (Data
Bank), 1995, pp. 360-361
BOJ, Comparative Economic and Financial Statistics; Japan and Other Major
Countries, 1992, p. 72
BOJ, Economic Statistics Annual, each year
Table 5 Quarterly Change of Nikkei Averaged 225 Index (yen, %)
quarter 1983 1984 1985 1986
I 8,083( 7.0) 10,149(25.5) 12,122(19.4) 13,635(12.5)
II 8,606(17.5) 10,542(22.5) 12,578(19.3) 16,251(29.2)
ill 9,109(28.5) 10,381(14.0) 12,651(21.9) 18,006(42.3)
N 9,427(23.7) 11,196(18.8) 12,875(15.0) 17,650(37.1)
Figures show the quarterly average of day to day Nikkei Averaged 225 Index.
Inside ofeach ( ) shows the growth rate since the same quarter of the previous year. (%)
(Source) Weekly Toyo Keizai, Extra Issue, Annual Economic Statistics (Data Bank),
1995, pp. 398-399
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Table 6 Sum of Buying/Selling Balance: by investors (10 billion yen)
~ total sum ofbuying I selling by general security companiesbreakdown ofthe entrustorsown en-trade trust- corporations security individuals foreignersed banks companies
1981 21 -3 24 61 24 -5 -42 11
82 33 -4 37 52 25 0 -33 18
83 54 -4 58 73 46 -1 -86 73
84 1 -12 13 212 115 -2 -6 -192
85 53 -16 69 258 153 -8 -94 -87
86 53 -18 71 638 426 -10 -178 -379
87 -23 -101 78 927 559 2 -131 -719
88 150 -195 345 691 417 -15 -335 5
89 111 -382 493 935 541 -11 -266 -165
1990 38 -44 82 192 -120 7 137
Figures are the total ofTokyo, Osaka, Nagoya Stock Exchanges.
(Source) Tokyo Stock Exchange, Annual Statistics ofSecurities, 1996, pp. 206-209
see that the excess purchase by corporation sector increased remarkably.
Most part of the increase was taken by banking sector. Vigorous buying of
stocks by banking sector from 1984 seems to have been the generating
energy for the sharp rise of stock prices during the period.
Why then did banks begin to increase their investment in securities
from 1984? The key to solve this problem lies in the abolition of yen-ten
regulation6) in June 1984 and the consequent inflow of massive short-term
capital from abroad. Now due to the strong pressure from the US-Japan
Dollar-Yen Committee led by US side, MOF had decided to abolish yen-
ten regulation in June 1984. As a result of this abolition it became
substantially easy for banks to take in short-term foreign money because
now banks had to make their yen-dollar position square only by overall
basis. That is to say, they were freed from the regulation which had forced
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banks for a long time to make yen-dollar position square on spot dealing
basis.
In short, after the abolition of yen-ten regulation, it had become
possible for banks to take in short-term foreign money more freely. In fact
they did so. And they invested the converted money themselves in assets
up to PA"l and lent it mainly as impact loans (ILs)71 after PA. Let us look
at Table 7. We notice that from 1984 ILs began to increase by leaps and
bounds. Next, the right column of Table 8 ("others") shows net short-term
borrowing of banks from abroad. From 1984 this borrowing by banks also
increased, which coincided with the increment of impact loan above. We
can safely suppose that IL was the main propelling power for the increase
of short-term capital inflow. Therefore we can infer that banks and firms
must have increased their investment in assets making use of IL as their
main source of investing fund.
IL is an English word coined in Japan. It means a loan made by banks
Table 7 Trend ofthe Impact Loan
(100 m. dollar)
~ sums sumsoutstandingcarried out at year end
1981 576 203
82 2,062 274
83 2,776 367
84 4,100 466
85 5,102 527
86 7,537 1,194
87 11,849 n. a.
88 17,225 n. a.
89 15,894 n. a.
• Figures are the total of short-term
and long-term impact loans.
• Both columns include foreign and
Japanese banks. But from 1984 on
the latter has been predominant in
both short and long terms.
• MOF does not show the outstanding
sum from 1987 on. (The reason is not
clear.)
(Source) MOF, Annual Report of International
Finance, each year
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to a business firm in a foreign currency, mostly in the US dollar. There
are both short- and long-term loans, the former being by far the more
important in quantity. Up to this point we can see no peculiar character.
However in Japan the firm who borrowed IL from a bank immediately
would sell the borrowed dollar to the very, or to another, bank and use the
converted money (yen, now) for a domestic purpose. It should be kept in
mind that the scale of the IL is surprisingly large, which we will mention
later again.
With regard to the borrowers, Annual Report of International Finance
by MOF, in its 1985 issue, explains as follows:
recently not only lenders but also borrowers have changed: until
some years ago lenders were city banks only, but by now local banks
and much smaller banks for small-and medium-sized firms, have
joined the party: the change on the borrowers' side is worth paying
more attention: some years ago borrowers were mostly
Table 8 Japanese Balance oflnternational Payments (100 m. dollar)
~ current capital a / c errors & overall financial a / cale long short omissions balance reserve others
1980 -107 23 31 -31 -84 49 -133
81 48 -97 23 5 -21 32 -53
82 69 -150 -16 47 -49 -51 2
83 208 -177 0 21 52 12 39
84 350 -497 -43 37 -152 18 -170
85 492 -645 -9 40 -123 2 -125
86 858 -1,315 -16 25 -448 157 -605
87 870 -1,365 239 -39 -295 392 -688
88 796 -1,309 195 28 -290 162 -452
89 572 -892 208 -220 -333 -128 -205
1990 358 -436 215 -208 -72 -78 6
(Source) BOJ, Economic Statistics Annual, 1993, pp. 330-331
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manufacturers but recently main borrowers have come to be
composed of construction, real estate industries, miscellaneous
financial institutions, leasing industries, and so on.
This remark by MOF on the changing composition of borrowers
disappeared from the next issue on, and has never appeared again, the
reason of which is not clear. But it is worth keeping in mind that
borrowers of the IL were shifting in the middle of 1980's to those types of
industries who played the leading part of the bubble drama.
Positive reason for firms to take in short-term foreign money had been
mainly because of its relatively lower rate of interest. Though the level of
short-term rates of interest was higher in the US than in Japan, the MOF
Annual Report says, it had been more reasonable for firms to raise short-
term fund in the Euro-market.8) Banks were able to earn exchange
commission in addition to the margin between lending and borrowing
rates. Furthermore when lending by means of IL, banks could avoid the
Window Guidance by BOJ, which was nothing but a direct form of credit
control through fixing a lending ceiling for each bank.
Firms converted the borrowed money into yen and invested it partly in
their primary business but increasingly in securities and lands as their
prices had begun to rise. Even when firms invested the converted money
in their primary business, the final result was an excessive increase of
their liquidity at hand, so that we could say the total effect of the inflow of
foreign money on asset markets was regardless of its direct usage.
Here we should not overlook the strong correlation between Tokkin'
Fan-tora (TF)9) and the sharp rise of stock prices. Coming back to Table 6,
we notice that the purchase of stocks by banking sector in excess of selling
markedly increased from 1984 and again from 1986. However when we
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examine the content of this increment, by far the most part of the
exceeding purchase was taken by trust banks.'O)
Tremendous swell of trust banks' stock purchasing owed to the
development ofTF. TF had become advantageous with regard to taxation
in 1981 compared with other financial assets. 11) The sharp rise of stock
prices after 1983, however, made TF all the more attractive. And firms
invested the converted money of IL directly or indirectly in stocks and in
lands. Here TF played an important role of the intermediary.
Before Plaza Agreement, however, the above mechanism had only
begun to evolve. As are seen in Tables 2, 3, 5,6, 7, 8 (above) and Table 9
(below), the full-scale development of the above mechanism, that is to say,
the mechanism of the soaring up of asset prices combined with the inflow
of short-term foreign money, will start after PA. Especially land prices,
which had shown remarkable rise only in the commercial district of six
largest cities (mainly Tokyo) in 1984, came to soar up along with the price
of stocks after PA. Note that the figure of March 1986, for example, in
Table 9 shows largely the rise in 1985.
Section 2 The Full-scale Stage of the Bubble
(1) The Plaza Agreement and Mer
As we have seen so far, a substantially rapid rise of asset prices had
already begun before PA. But the full-scale development of the rise of
asset prices is to be seen only after the PA. Why? The chart below
(page 17) is intended to show the correlation between PA and massive
inflow of foreign short-term capital. And the latter greatly concerns the
appreciation ofyen on one hand, and asset inflation on the other hand.
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Table 9 Annual Growth Rate of Land Prices in Urban Districts
I~ all urban 6 largest citiesdistricts average commercial residential industrial
1979.3 4.5% 7.4% 5.4% 12.6% 4.0%
1980.3 8.6 13.2 13.3 20.6 8.7
81.3 8.7 8.5 6.7 10.6 6.7
82.3 7.1 6.6 8.0 6.6 5.5
83.3 4.7 4.8 6.8 3.9 3.6
84.3 3.2 5.2 8.9 3.5 3.3
85.3 2.8 7.4 13.2 5.5 3.6
86.3 2.9 14.2 28.8 9.6 5.0
87.3 5.4 25.9 33.8 27.0 17.0
88.3 10.0 27.9 41.7 23.1 19.3
89.3 7.6 24.4 25.1 15.3 33.0
1990.3 14.1 30.0 27.6 33.1 29.5
Calculations are based on land price index. (end of 1980 = 100)
(Source) The Japan Real Estate Institute, Land Price Indexes of Urban Districts, each
year
PA expectation for the appreciation ofyen --+--+--+ massive inflow of short-term
capital
.. 'at first: all-at-once intervention
to rectify the dollar appreciation
.... 'afterwards: US-Japan "co-operative"
BRcuts
(From PA onward, US stated
repeatedly yen should and would
rise, which market believed &
expected.)
firms: could gain
exchange profit
by borrowing in
dollar and
repaying in yen
;.... banks: enormous exchange
commission
(recall the high
commission charge
in Japan)
At the Plaza Conference of G 5 in September 1985, it was agreed that
the appreciation of the US dollar should be rectified and should be
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depreciated against yen and German mark, in particular. It was decided
that the means to lower the US dollar should be the multilateral
intervention of G 5 authorities. And that was all. In other words, no co-
operation of monetary policy was agreed at this conference. However the
decision that yen should be appreciated brought about a strong
expectation for the rise of yen in the exchange market. As a result,
Japanese banks began borrowing the US dollar massively from abroad
and lending it to firms as IL. From the viewpoint of firms, if they borrow
in dollar and repay in yen, exchange profit could be gained. (Recall the
mechanism of the IL, referring to footnote 7 againY2)
The merit for the banks is not necessarily clear. But Annual Report of
International Finance by MOF, in its 1989 version, referred to the effort of
banks to "sell" the IL to firms. Probably banks were able to earn enormous
exchange commission, because in Japan commission charge was very high
due to the monopoly of exchange business by banks. I.)
Let us give a glance at Table 7, again. We notice that both the carried
out- and the outstanding sums of the IL began to increase tremendously
after PA. It would be worth mentioning that the increase of the
outstanding IL in 1986 was no less than 67 billion dollars which was more
than one third of the increase of all banks' lending of the year in Japan. 14)
Mter that the increase of the outstanding IL must have shared more than
half of the banks' total lending outstanding. (Unfortunately outstanding
sum ofIL had not been disclosed since 1987 as mentioned above.) Looking
at Table 10, firms' liquidity at hand began to increase at the same time
and seemed to have become excessive after 1986 judging from our
historical standard. As their liquidity at hand became excessive, so the
firms increased their investments in assets.
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Table 10 Corporate Finance (Ratio of Liquidity) (%)
~ cash & deposit & liquid asset securities cash & depositsmonthly sales monthly sales
1981 1.11 0.76
82 1.09 0.75
83 1.18 0.79
84 1.16 0.78
85 1.16 0.79
86 1.49 1.00
87 1.71 1.21
88 1.91 1.44
89 2.02 1.58
1990 1.77 1.31
BOJ, Economic Statistics Annual, each year
However why did the expectation for the appreciation of yen
continue even after the multilateral intervention was over, and
after yen appreciated to the degree that the Plaza Conference expected?
Because, as will be seen below, the so-called "co-operative BR cuts" in
1986-87 played the role to drive the market to expect further appreciation
of yen. (With regard to the detail of the co-operative BR cuts, see
Note on the So-called "Co-o erative BR Cuts" in 1986-87
at the end.)
The PA and co-operative BR cuts greatly concern the mechanism of co-
development of yen appreciation and soaring up of asset prices. Let us
look at the chart on page 20.
The co-operative BR cuts brought about a strong expectation for the
appreciation of yen. Why? Because first of all, the cuts contained no
element to strengthen the US dollar. In 1986 both US and Japan reduced
the BR by 2.0% altogether one after the other, so that the gap of the level
of interest rates between US and Japan did not change at all. Second, US-
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{Factor A}
co-operative
BRcuts
expectation of
yen apprecia-
tion
fall of interest
rates in Japan
{FactorB}
soaring up of
asset prices
short-term capital 1+- ®_4_{v_ic_i_ou_s_ci_rc_l_e) ...J
inflow from abroad
~®
selling pressure on @
dollar in the
interbank
spot market
dollar selling by banks
to institutional inves-
tors (the Sei-ho,
especially)
® investing in
US bonds
dollar depreciation
yen appreciation
<D US does not stop attacking yen.
® Borrowing in dollar is favorable.
® Firms sell borrowed dollar at once to banks (in the IL case).
® vicious circle
@, ® US bonds include both risk and high-return prospects (capital gain
due to the reduction of interest rates in US, in particular. See Economic
Planning Agency, Economic Survey ofJapan, 1993-94)
[Government supported the Sei-ho (--banks) to buy US securities by
abolishing a regulation of external security investments (1986).)
Japan trade kept on marking increasingly the deficit on the US side.
Third, in the meantime, US authorities often publicized, during and after
the individual negotiations on BR cuts, some complaining statements that
the appreciation of yen was still not enough (so-called "talking down"). All
these factors, put together, produced a further expectation for the rise of
yen. The short-term capital inflow would become all the more brisk. This
would result in a selling pressure on dollar in the inter-bank spot market.
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The dollar will fall, while the yen will rise. These logical chains of causes
and effects are shown as Factor A on the left side of the chart above.
On the other hand, successive cuts of interest rates resulted in soaring
up of asset prices. This relation of cause and effect is shown as Factor B in
the same chart on page 20. A vicious circle becomes unavoidable, because
if asset prices rose, borrowing from abroad and investing in Japanese
assets would become advantageous, while if borrowing from abroad
increased and flowed into asset markets, so prices of asset would rise.
Preceding researches seem to have overlooked this mechanism and
failed to explain why rapid rise of asset prices went on simultaneously
with the sharp rise of yen. If some exaggeration is allowed, we could say
the rise of yen and the rise of asset prices was only the two sides
of a coin.
Anyway it will be worth noting that there were two main factors, shown
in double-lined rectangles in the chart on page 20 for the asset prices to
soar up. (We will call these simply Factor A and Factor B below.) During
1986 and basically up to the BM, these two factors, which supported the
rise of asset prices, remained undamaged.
(2) The Louvre Agreement and Washington G 5
Then, however, why did the LA, which marked the change of the
U. S. strategy on the rate of exchange, not bring about a reverse
movement in Japanese exchange- and asset markets? Next let us
examine the LA and its effect.
Before the LA, the attitude of the U S authorities toward the exchange
rate had changed. US Treasury had been positive in lowering both the
price of US dollar and its level of interest rates. But toward the end of
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1986, it ceased to try to lower the US dollar further. There seem to have
been three reasons for that. First, in spite of the rapid appreciation of yen,
US import from Japan did not decrease at all. As a result, from the US
viewpoint, trade balance of Japan with US was not improved as shown
below. (Table 11)
Second, being stimulated by the succesive cuts of BR, US inflation had
begun to show a sign of development.'·) The third and the most important
factor was that subscriptions for the US Treasury securities from abroad
began to show a sign of decrease from the last quarter of 1986 and lasted
for about one year.16) J. Baker, US Secretary of Treasury, was badly
nervous about this.17)
Due to these factors the U S had turned to anti-dollar-depreciation
policy before Louvre Conference. Louvre Conference was to be a
conference to prevent the depreciation of US dollar further. But in spite of
this, the dollar kept on depreciating. Why, then, was US unable to attain
its purpose of preventing a further depreciation of the dollar? Because the
decision of the Conference included a few fatal weakpoints.'8)
1 The relation between so-called "margin'" "band" and participating
governments' intervention was entirely ambiguous.
2 The intervention was not of a compulsory character but would be
Table 11 Japanese Balance ofVisible Trade with US (100 m. US dollar)
~ 1984 1985 1986 1987quarter
1 st 58 66 104 110
2nd 87 102 126 136
3 rd 90 105 138 134
4 th 96 122 146 141
(Source) MOF, Foreign Trade Overview, each year
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carried out through a discussion for agreement.
3 The central rate was to be re-based at Washington G 5 in April
which was only two months ahead.
4 The "margin" and the "band" were to be kept in secret.
Furthermore, just as at the Plaza Conference, there was no agreement
on monetary policy. In short, from the view of the market, the agreement
of the Conference remained quite vague. Such an agreement could not
gain any confidence from the market. In March when the trade deficit of
the U. S. was again publicized, US dollar began to fall further from the
level of LA.
With Japan as the most eager part, the governments of G 5 intervened
into the market. But the eagerness, and the sum of money for the
intervention were quite dispersed. In spite of the huge sum used for the
intervention, the US dollar had fallen by about 5% before the Washington
G 5. And this current rate was admitted as the new central rate at the
Conference, which entirely denied the authority of the LA, but it was
absolutely clear that such a result was due to the latter's weakness.
In short, we can say the US, during the period from LA to BM, did not
provide any tough pillar to support its new strategy, i. e. preventing
further depreciation of the dollar. That would be the answer to the above
question raised in gothic letters (on page 21).
(3) Black Monday
In early September US at last turned its policy by itself, as it were, to
check further fall of the US dollar. FRB raised the BR by 0.5% to 6.0%
after 41 months. By now it had become essential for US to keep the gap of
interest rate levels with other countries and to secure the inflow of foreign
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capital for the finance of deficit on the balance of international
payments.'·)
Germany and Japan also tried to follow US and guided the short-term
rate of interest higher. Inside the BOJ activity to raise BR was becoming
heated. BOJ had kept short-term rates of interest higher. But Baker was
aware of the movement and pressed Governor Sumita at a conference not
to raise Japanese BR. Japan followed his asking. On the other hand
Germany outstayed with higer rates, which irritated Baker. When Baker
issued a statement at an occasion threatening Germany that if Germany
continued to keep its interest rates high the LA might be cancelled, which
meant the US dollar might fall drastically again. This statement aroused
a panic in financial markets and brought about the famous Black
Monday.20)
(4) Mter the Black Monday to the End of 1988
Japanese authorities, especially the government, became very timid of
turning to tight-money policy. They thought, if Japan raised its BR, the
US dollar rate might drastically drop and a world-wide confusion might
be brought about. And there seemed to be no serious economic troubles
inside Japan. Lands and securities had become valuable, and most people
felt richer than before. In short, there was no strong impact for them to
tighten the financial market.
On the other hand, BOJ had been seeking for a chance to turn to tight
money, especilly since July 1987.21) Note that the date is before BM. It was
not that the Bank had predicted the emergence of the serious non-
performing debt problem at all, but simply that as a guard of the value of
money, they had felt very uncomfortable to continue extraordinary cheap
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money policy further. 22)
But in the financial market, tide had already changed. The above two
factors which are shown on page 20 began to disappear. First, the U Shad
raised its BR in early September 1987 under the new chairman
Greenspan as mentioned above. And when the U. S. and Germany raised
their BR in the summer of 1988 (US: from 6.0 to 6.5% in August.
Germany: from 2.5 to 3.0 and 3.5% in July and August), the change of
the trend had become substantial.
In Japan the short-term interest rates began to rise markedly from
July, 1988. Factor A in page 20 was disappearing.
(5) The Year 1989
Mainly due to the successive BR raises by Germany (from 3.5 to 4.0 %
in January) and US (from 6.5 to 7.0% in February), the expectation for the
rise of yen began to shrink and, in fact, yen continued to fall gradually
during the year. Reflecting these circumstances, banks' procurement of
short-term money from abroad began to show a sign of decrease. Let us
look at Tables 7 and 8 again. Still there was massive lending in the form
of IL. But for the first time the carried out sum decreased compared with
the previous year. And the net total sum of short-term money raised from
abroad decreased remarkably compared from the previous year.
That is to say, the two factors (factor A and factor B on page 20) which
had been supporting the rapid rise of asset prices had already
disappeared, when BOJ decided to raise BR (May 1989) and started to
turn to tight money stance. In this sense, return to tight money was
decidedly delayed. The successive raises were not of a character of
preventing but of entirely past saving.
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Conclusion
We are not qualified for criticizing the then BOJ and MOF. No one
predicted the seriousness of the non-performing debt problem beforehand.
Ifone had been energetically discussing against the swelling of the bubble
for the reason that it might cause a serious tangle of debt and credit, he
(she) would be qualified. But in fact no one did so. Still we are able to
learn some lessons of the bubble this time.
1 We had a similar experience in Japan from 1920 to the outbreak of
Manchurian Incident in 1931. We failed to learn from our historical
lesson. In other words asset prices should become an important
indicator of the overheating economy.
2 More attention should have been paid to the movement of
international short-term capital. With regard to this we also had a
historical experience no more than 15 years ago, counting the date from
1985 backward, at the time of so-called "excess liquidity inflation" in
1973, preceding the first Oil Crisis.
The different characteristic of this time from 1973 is that money
supply did not increase so markedly partly because huge outflow of
long-term capital mitigated the massive inflow of short-term capital,
and that general prices hardly rose.
3 Half-way international co-operation should not have been carried out.
If it was necessary, the decision ofthe Conferences should have stood on
a solid basis, for example, the decision of the Louvre Conference should
have been observed by a compulsory intervention and a solid co-
operation of monetary policy.
But the co-operations as a whole, which were carried out in 1986-87,
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should not have taken place. Because the unnatural rise of US dollar up
to 1985 was the product ofthe earlier stage of Reaganomics, US should
have solved its own problem.
4 It is now a common reflection that if the international co-operation
had been given as a prerequisite, BOJ should have started to raise its
BR, at latest, in summer 1988.
5 With regard to an ordinary inflation, monetary aggregates can be one
of the useful indicators of the overheating of the economy. However, to
pay attention only to monetary aggregates can be dangerous with
regard to a typical asset inflation like the very Japanese case we
examined here. Note that the "real" growth of monetary aggregates in
Japan [see the bottom of Table 1-(3)J was rather in the middle among
advanced countries, while the scale of the bubble in Japan was
outstanding.
6 In either inflation of 1973-74 and of the later 1980's, firms' liquidity
at hand showed a remarkable change. This might be a useful indicator
of the overheating economy.
Notes
1) A detailed examination of preceding researches is given in A. Ichinose,
Representative Arguments on the Formation of Bubbles: Pigeonholing, Okayama
Economic Review, Vol. 29, No.3 (Dec. 1997) and in A. Ichinose and H. Sunami (1999),
Supplementary Chapter 2
2) Y. Suzuki(1993), pp. 104-106
3) Bubble: commonly defined as the rise of asset prices beyond a certain line. The line
is provided by so-called "fundamentals" in asset markets, i. e. firms' profits and
interest rates. But this definition is, though plausible, misleading. Fundamentals may
include extraordinarily low interest rates and high profits as well. After the bubble
burst, such low interest rates and high profits could be deemed as the base of the
bubble. Current profit of companies could include profits due to buying/selling of
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bubble assets. If, therefore, we capitalize such profits and explain the resulting price
as within the range offundamentals, we would fall into a logical contradiction.
In this paper we have taken a very naive approach. We have regarded a historically
unusual rise of asset prices as a bubble. It will not be wise to stop here to discuss the
merit and demerit ofthis naive approach.
4) S. Sumita, the then Governor of BOJ, had guided short-term rates of interest higher
in order to promote further appreciation of yen and to prepare for the cut of BR. (U.
Shiota et al. ,Men Who Operate Interest Rates (1992), pp. 179-183)
5) Yen-ten ("ten" means "conversion") regulation had been enforced by the government
to restrict the conversion of borrowed dollar into yen. It was aimed not only at reducing
the exchange risk of banks but also at controlling the international short-term capital
flow.
6) Thus the foreign short-term capital taken in by banks was used differently according
to the periods. As to the detail, see A. Ichinose and H. Sunami (1999), Chapter 5.
7) Impact loan is a loan to firms in foreign currency (mainly, the US dollar). But this
loan is, in fact, a loan in yen. Firms will sell the borrowed dollar at once to banks. They
will invest the converted money (yen, now) in their primary business or in assets. Even
in the former case, firms' liquidity at hand will increase and their investments in asset
markets will thus indirectly increase.
8) This statement appears repeatedly in each issue of the Annual Report of
International Finance.
9) Tokkin (Toku-tei-kin-sen-shin-taku) is one way of trusting money with a trust bank.
The money would be invested following the primary investor's (or his / her agent's)
instruction. The agent is usually a security company. Trust banks could not invest the
trusted money at their own disposaL Fan-tora (Japanese pronunciation of 'fund trust':
but fund trust is also a mere nick-name.) is another way of trusting money. Here trust
banks can invest the trusted money at their own disposal (independent of the security
company).
10) See Tokyo Stock Exchange, Annual Statistics of Securities. In addition , trust
business has been carried out by trust banks in Japan. However genuine trust
business has not been so brisk. Instead the trust banks have run a type of term loan
(Kashi-tsuke-shin-taku) vigorously. This is nothing but a form oftime deposit. Tokkin
and Fan-tora were long-expected new types of trust business.
11) Y. Miyazaki (1992), pp. 137-139
12) In the "bubble period" it is said that 30% or so of the total IL was carried out on
"open 'basis, i. e. firms borrowed US dollar without hedging exchange risk, so that in
return for the risk they could gain exchange profit. The remaining 70% or so was
carried out with hedging through buying back "future", so that superficially firms
could not gain exchange profit.
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However in the real business world, even in this case firms would have been able to
obtain exchange profit, because under the appearance of hedged IL firms could delay
the counterpart "future buying" a little so as to gain exchange profit.
13) For example, in February 1992, a customer still had to pay a commission of 0.8%
when he / she bought (sold) foreign money from (to) a bank. In the case of an IL, the
commission money payable to banks became 1.6 % of the contracted loan because firms
usually had to pay it both in buying and selling.
14) Converting into yen in terms of the average exchange rate through the year, this 67
billion dollar will be about 11,000 billion yen. The increase of total lendings by
"nationwide banks" (city banks, regional banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks)
during the year 1986 was about 31,000 billion yen.
15) According to IMF, International Financial Statisttics (May 1987, p. 517) both
wholesale and consumer prices rose substantially in December 1986 and January
1987.
16) See Federal Reserve Bulletin, each issue.
17) Funahashi(1988), pp. 263, 313.
18) Funahashi(1988), pp. 301-314
19) Shiota(1992), pp. 219-213
20) Miyazaki(l992), pp. 141-148
21) Shiota(1992), pp. 220-223
22) Shiota(1992), pp. 204-205
Supplementary Note on the So-called "Co-operative BR Cuts"
in 1986-87
The so-called "co-operative BR cuts" played a role in driving the market to expect
further appreciation ofyen. Why? Because in the process of co-operative cuts, US kept on
pressing Japan's BR cut, ahead of its own reduction, on BOJ. This meant to confess the
weakness of US economy at that time both in the foreign trade competitiveness and in
the value of its currency, American dollar. The market reacted.
There were two reasons for US to press BR cuts on Japan. One reason is easy to
understand. US business had begun to show a sign toward recession after entering 1986
and it was necessary for US authorities to cut BR in US. But if Japan remains to be at
the same level of interest rates as before, its demand for US exports may be sluggish,
taking the rapid appreciation of yen into accounts. Therefore it was necessary for US
authorities to ask BOJ to reduce its BR.
The other reason was the necessity to keep the gap between the levels of interest rates
in US and other countries (notably Japan and Germany). It was necessary for US to
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secure the inflow of capital from other countries. This subject is, however, not simply
understandable, because it related to the dispersion of opinions and interests among
leading groups in US. Baker Treasury, during the period from PA to LA, seems to have
been rather indifferent to keeping the gap. The Treasury was positive in reducing BR of
US to stimulate domestic business and lower US dollar. In the meanwhile P. Volcker,
chairman of FRB, was earnest to maintain the above gap in order not to bring about the
drastic fall of the US dollar, so that he is less positive in reducing American BR.
Agricultural group and the manufacturers supported the former. They had become
influential in the Houses again. Financial world and tertiary industries backed the
latter. (With regard to such political interests, Funahashi (1988) gives us excellent and
detailed information.) Thus there seems to have been a concealed discrepancy of opinion
in America as to keeping the gap of interest rate levels between US and Japan=
Germany.
Anyway, however, put the problem ofthe gap of interest rate levels aside, two opinions
in America could co-operate in pressing the cut of BR on Japan in order to promote US
exports.
In Japan, for the purpose of coping with the decrease of export due to the rapid
appreciation of yen, the government was earnest in reducing BR. BOJ was not strongly
against the cuts, either, aUeast until the middle of 1986. Thus under the constant and
strong pressure from US, BOJ reduced BR three times in the first half of the year,
while US did so two times.
US wished to continue the co-operative BR cuts in such style, but in Japan the so-
called domestic faction in BOJ began to strengthen their opposition and MOF was not
able to persuade BOJ this time. So America was forced to cut their rate alone in
July and August. Minister of Finance, N. Takeshita, a typical Japanese politician, is
reported not to have pressed the cut so forcefully on Governor Sumita.
In July, however, Minister of Finance changed from Takeshita to K. Miyazawa who
was known from his young days as a supporter of an expansive fiscal policy. In
September and October both Baker and Volcker pushed Miyazawa to cut Japanese BR.
Miyazawa promised Baker to arrange a Volcker = Sumita meeting. After all, Sumita was
persuaded by Volcker. In the meantime there were a few delicate and complicated
negotiations between BOJ and MOF under surface. But at last BOJ as a whole had to
give up opposing. Thus around 20 October the fourth cut was decided and was
put into practice from 1 st November.
The fifth cut of February 1987, publicized at the same time as the Louvre
Agreement, had been decided in fact at Baker=Miyazawa meeting in January
1987. Yen had been rising still, which could menace the political life of Miyazawa. So
Miyazawa flew suddenly over to Washington D.C. on 21 January to ask Baker his co-
operation in stabilizing dollar-yen rate. Baker agreed to co-operate with the exchange
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rate at around 1 dollar=150 yen. The fifth cut was the return for this statement of
Baker's. This time Miyazawa already had received a consent from Sumita beforehand. It
seems that the domestic faction in BOJ were forced to obey the established fact in which
the Governor had been concerned.
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The Bubble and Monetary Policy in Japan: 1984-1990
Atsushi Ichinose
There will be no great opposition, among Japanese people, to the
assertion that the problem of non-performing debt was the most
important inducement to the present serious depression in Japan. The
non-performing debt problem was brought about by the huge swell of the
bubble in the later 1980's and its collapse after entering 1990's. As for the
causes ofthe bubble formation several useful books were published rather
intensively during 1992-93. But in February 1994, Mr. Mieno, the then
Governor of the Bank of Japan, stated at a lecturing speech that the
causes of the bubble had not been clarified yet. He enumerated some
problems to be solved, for example why bubbles took place almost
simultaneously over the world, and why such tremendous rise of asset
prices occurred. Basically this reflection seems to be right.
Relevant researches, which were published mostly during 1992-1993,
if we dare to simplify, pointed out two factors as the important causes of
the bubble: various financial de-regulations and long-lasted cheap money
policy which was closely concerned with the so-called" international co-
operation of economic policy" in 1986-87.
This paper is not against these arguments at all. However it calls
attentions to the fact that preceding researches have overlooked an
important problem to be solved: that is to say, the problem of the
correlation between the rapid appreciation of yen and the soaring up of
asset prices. The paper tries to analyze the simultaneous development of
yen appreciation and asset inflation. Consequently it points out that the
key factor was the massive inflow of foreign short-term capital. In other
words, banks took in huge short-term money from abroad and lent it to
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firms as impact loan, which is presumably a peculiar Japanese financial
instrument. Firms converted borrowed dollar into yen and invested it in
asset markets. In the case of stocks, Tokkin & Fan-tora, deposited with
trust banks, played an important role as the intermediary. Thus the
prices of assets rose steeply.
The banks' huge taking-in of foreign short-term money resulted in a
strong selling pressure on US dollar in the exchange market. Thus the
dollar fell and the yen rose. A pioneering work along this line is S. Nakao
(1991). Unfortunately he confines his interest to the relation between the
activities of banks and the appreciation of yen, putting the co-
development of yen appreciation and the asset inflation out of his
argument.
In addition, preceding researches, which stress the financial de-
regulations as the most important cause of the bubble, tend only to
enumerate various de-regulations. And they seem to have been
unsuccessful in clarifying what part of the de-regulations was crucial.
This paper deems the abolitions of regulations on impact loan and on yen-
ten as crucial. It was these de-regulations that played by far the most
important roles in the formation ofthe bubble.
Finally, the reader will see some concluding remarks at the end of the
paper. The main concern of the paper lies, however, in the field of fact
verification. What to learn or derive from verified facts belongs rather to a
role of politicians and high officials.
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